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The bulk of extant work finds that immigrant prevalence helps to reduce 
neighborhood levels of serious crime. These findings align with the “immigrant 
revitalization thesis” in which states that immigration reduces crime by strengthening 
social ties and attendant social controls as well as stimulating the local economy. 
Also, a city’s conditions are shown to be a substantial moderator for the immigration-
crime nexus. Thus, this study tests whether labor instability at the city level shapes 
the immigration-crime relationship, and whether this interaction differs by gateway 
status. Using the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) which provides 
information on crime as well as demographics for 87 cities across 8,931 
neighborhoods, I fit multilevel models for violent and property crime, and for 
gateway and non-gateway cities. This paper finds that in cities with a higher level of 
labor instability, immigrant prevalence is associated with reductions in neighborhood 
level of violent crime, but not property crime. This interaction effect is significant for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The nexus between immigration and violent crime has been extensively 
examined, and the most recent assessment has shown that immigration does not affect 
or is inversely related to neighborhood crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). For example, 
Akins and his colleagues (2009) found that in Austin, Texas, recent immigrants had 
no significant effect on the neighborhood homicide rate. Graif and Sampson (2009) 
also found that immigrant concentration yielded no impact on the neighborhood 
homicide rate in Chicago. On the other hand, other recent studies demonstrated that 
higher concentration of immigrants is related to lower levels of neighborhood 
homicide and violent crime (Feldmeyer, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Lee et al., 
2001; Lee & Martinez, 2002; MacDonald & Hipp, 2013, Stowell & Martinez, 2009; 
Velez, 2009). To explain this protective influence of immigration on neighborhood 
crime, scholars draw on the "immigrant revitalization perspective." This line of 
thinking argues that immigration is expected to reduce crime mostly because the 
concentration of immigrants strengthens social ties and attendant social controls, as 
well as stimulates economic growth,  and these benefits lead to reductions in 
neighborhood crime (Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). 
Given the pervasive findings of the protective effect of immigration, scholars 
have called for research that further elucidates this inverse relationship. A promising 
area of research is embedding the neighborhood relationship of immigration and 
crime within the city context. Cities are essential because their environments and 





crime. In particular, previous studies revealed that immigration varies by immigrant 
political opportunity structures (Lyons et al., 2013) and by gateway status (Harris & 
Fledmeyer, 2012; Ramey, 2013; Velez & Lyons, 2012). For instance, in cities with 
favorable immigrant political opportunities, the negative relationship between 
immigrant concentration and neighborhood violence was reinforced such that 
immigration was particularly beneficial for warding off neighborhood violence in 
sanctuary cities (Lyons et al., 2013). Also, researchers found that the beneficial effect 
of immigrants on crime is limited to gateways, which are ports of entry for 
immigrants and thus have supportive "contexts of reception" for immigrants (Portes 
& Rumbaut, 2006; Singer, 2004). This growing body of work indicates that a city's 
conditions are important in exploring the nexus between immigration and 
neighborhood crime.  
I build on previous studies to explore how another contextual factor at the city 
level, economic conditions, shapes how immigration relates to crime. Do the 
protective mechanisms that immigration sets in motion per the revitalization 
perspective get undercut when it takes place in a struggling city economy? An 
unsteady city economy is characterized by labor instability, which is measured by the 
amount of secondary sector low-wage jobs and joblessness. Studies found that job 
competition in the low-wage jobs market would increase conflicts between 
immigrants and native minorities and leads to a rise in neighborhood violent crime 
(Reed & Danziger, 2007; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a; Waldinger, 1997). Frictions 
in the labor market may weaken the social ties among colleagues and between 





Informal social control is defined as “the linkage of cohesion and mutual trust with 
shared expectations for intervening in support of neighborhood social control” 
(Sampson et al., 1999, p.612). Accordingly, it may be that in cities with labor 
instability, the benefits of immigration on crime are diminished. Conversely, it is 
possible that immigration becomes more powerful and more effective in its protective 
influence against crime when the city is struggling economically. In neighborhoods 
that have higher immigrant concentration, immigrants are more likely to develop 
"ethnic enclaves" (Martinez et al., 2010; Sampson, 2008). When the labor market is 
sluggish, immigrants may become more likely to utilize their social networks, such as 
relatives and neighbors, to obtain jobs in these ethnic businesses. In this case, 
immigrants may have broader and protective networks and have better chances to 
work in "ethnic enclaves." Working, even in low-wage jobs, helps immigrants 
establish ties with labor markets and boost informal social controls (Crutchfield, 
1989). I also explore how the conditioning influence of labor instability on crime may 
operate differently by a city’s gateway status. Gateways are cities with metropolitan 
populations greater than one million and a long history of immigrant settlement or 
that have experienced fast immigrant population growth between 1990 and 2000 
(Singer, 2004). Since ethnic enclaves are more likely to bloom in gateway cities 
(Ousey & Kubrin, 2009), the beneficial effects of immigrants on crime may differ 
between the gateway and non-gateway cities (Lee & Martinez, 2002; Martinez, 2006; 
Martinez et al., 2004). Thus, I anticipate city labor instability will moderate the 
association between immigrants and neighborhood crime, and this moderation effect 





The objective of the current study is to investigate how the relationship 
between neighborhood immigration and crime is moderated by unfavorable economic 
conditions in the city, namely when it is characterized by "labor instability," which 
refers to the presence of low quality and unstable jobs (Crutchfield, 1989; Crutchfield 
& Pitchford, 1997; Krivo & Peterson, 2004). In addition, I will explore whether the 
interaction effect between immigration and labor instability varies by the city’s 
gateway status. The National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) is appropriate for 
conducting multilevel analyses to assess the cross-level moderating effect of cities' 
labor instability on the immigrant-crime nexus. The data have both the neighborhood 
level and city level information, and the variables of interest in this study are widely 
available in the dataset (Peterson & Krivo, 2010a). 
Little research has considered the moderating effect of economic conditions 
on the immigration-crime relationship. Theoretically, economic conditions are 
important to understand social inequality, concentrated disadvantage, and family 
structure, and these factors are closely related to neighborhood crime (Peterson & 
Krivo, 2010a; Vaughn et al., 2014; Wilson, 1987). Even though studies have 
examined the moderating influence of neighborhood disadvantage, racial segregation, 
or gentrification (Kreager et al., 2011, Peterson & Krivo, 2010a, Velez, 2009), little 
of them consider moderating influence of economic conditions. For example, 
Crutchfield and his colleagues (Unpublished) evaluated how characteristics of the 
metropolitan labor market moderated the relationship between neighborhood labor 
instability and crime. They found that neighborhood labor instability positively 





consider the economic influences of immigrants. Xie and Baumer (2018) also 
examined whether the relationship between immigrant concentration and violent 
crime is conditioned on labor market characteristics, and they didn't find any 
significant moderating effects. However, their indicators of the labor market are not 
"labor instability," and they are measured at the county level. Given existing research, 
the purpose of the current study is to fill the gap in the literature to examine how city 
economic conditions would moderate the association between immigration 
concentration and neighborhood crime. The results from the analyses will allow us to 
understand whether the association between immigration and neighborhood crime 
across various cities, including gateway and non-gateway cities, is influenced by the 
city's economic status. I go beyond previous assessments by integrating the effect of 
economic conditions and immigration and by investigating this interaction effect in 




















Chapter 2: Conceptual Arguments  
 
Immigration and Crime 
In contrast to some theoretical arguments and public beliefs that immigration 
concentration will increase crime, prior studies reported that immigration 
concentration does not positively affect neighborhood crime and, in some cases, even 
negatively relate to crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). Studies showed that immigrant 
prevalence has no significant relationship with neighborhood crime. Immigrant 
concentration has no significant effect in predicting neighborhood homicide, and the 
increasing foreign-born population has no influence on neighborhood violent crime 
(Akins et al., 2009; Graif & Sampson, 2009; Chavez & Griffiths; 2009). Moreover, 
for the research that found a statistically significant association between immigration 
and crime, the majority of the results showed a negative relationship (Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2018). Neighborhoods with higher immigrant concentration were found to be 
associated with lower homicide rates and other measures of violent crime (Fledmeyer, 
2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Lee et al., 2001; Lee & Martinez, 2002). Also, 
growth in recent immigrants was only found in stable neighborhoods with a low 
prevalence of violent crime (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009). Beyond the neighborhood 
level, cities that historically have a higher number of immigrants or are experiencing 
a growth in immigrants also found a decline in violent crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; 
Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). Ousey and Kubrin (2018) show that despite 
some limitations on uniformity of measurements and using cross-sectional data, there 
is a relatively consistent conclusion that immigration has a null effect or a negative 





Although there is a vast pool of literature studying the immigration-crime 
nexus, most examines violent crime while ignoring property crime. Previous research 
on immigration and crime heavily focused on violent crime, especially homicide 
(Graif & Sampson, 2009; Martinez, 2002; Martinez et al., 2010), but we know little 
about the influence of immigration on property crime. However, property crime may 
be another measurement that indicates immigrants are struggling in the U.S. labor 
market (Butcher & Piehl,1998; Hagan and Palloni, 1998). Hagan and Palloni (1998) 
argued that property crime is an important instrument for immigrants to be financially 
sufficient to support themselves and establish themselves in America. To illustrate, 
Kubrin and her colleagues (2018) found that immigrant concentration is not 
significantly related to violent crime but substantially reduces property crime at the 
neighborhood level. On the other hand, Peterson and Krivo (2010a) found that 
immigration reduces both violent crime and property crime rates. Thus, another 
contribution of the current study is looking into the difference or similarity of 
immigration’s effect on violent crime and property crime. 
One of the most compelling arguments that explain how immigrant 
concentration is negatively related to neighborhood crime is the “immigrant 
revitalization perspective” (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). Basing on the “immigrant 
revitalization perspective,” immigration concentration reduces neighborhood crime 
by strengthening social ties and social controls, as well as invigorating local economy 
(Feldmeyer, 2009; Lee et al., 2001; Martinez, 2002; Martinez et al., 2004; Reid et al., 
2005). First, the revitalization thesis posits that the intact structure in immigrant 





enclaves translates into social ties which are expected to exert social control (Ousey 
& Kubrin, 2009). For instance, Dohan (2003), in a study of Guadalupe, a Mexican 
barrio with a high concentration of immigrants in California, demonstrated that 
immigrant families and neighborhoods exercise social controls by gathering and 
overseeing children who hangout in the yards in the evening. His study illustrated that 
immigrant populated neighborhoods might have strong informal social controls that 
immigrants in these communities make collective efforts to maintain order in public 
spaces. Thus, immigrants could develop firm social ties and fortify informal social 
control in neighborhoods, and these communities are more likely to have stronger ties 
and social control that helps to prevent crime (Figure1-a). 
Second, immigrant concentration revitalizes the local economy (Portes & 
Zhou, 1993; Sampson, 2017; Vigdor, 2014). In places with a higher concentration of 
immigrants, there is an increased amount of low-wage jobs and consumption in the 
immigrant community, which eventually formed “ethnic enclaves” (Sampson, 2008; 
Waldinger, 1989). According to Portes and Zhou (1993), ethnic enclaves create new 
job opportunities through culturally specific restaurants, vendors, and other divisions 
of labor to respond to the increasing need for immigrant populations. Dohan (2003) 
found that for residents in Guadalupe, the most common means of earning income are 
legal earnings through low-wage jobs or illegal earning through illegal activities. 
Whichever methods they choose, opportunities for both low-wage jobs and illicit 
activities are reached through their families, friends, and neighbors. As an illustration, 
Jose in Dohan’s study (2003) got his part-time job in a food-processing plant where 





it. Consistent with the previous study (Portes and Zhou,1993), people in Guadalupe 
are less likely to commit crimes because they have a greater attachment to the labor 
market and conventional lifestyles. Thus, the economic growth by providing job 
opportunities in ethnic enclaves spurs the local economy and creates substantial social 
ties in labor markets, and eventually reduces crime (Martinez, 2006) (Figure1-b).  
While the research at the macro-level consistently shows that immigration 
helps to reduce crime, a concern with these works is that these beneficial effects have 
nothing to do with community level dynamics but something to do with immigrants 
themselves. That is, the inverse relationship can be reduced to the compositional 
characteristics of immigrants. Two issues are particularly important here. First, 
immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than natives (Butcher & Piehl, 1998). 
There are high costs for both illegal and immigrants to commit crimes, such as 
deportation (Sampson, 2008). Due to the laborious process of immigration, rather 
than having a higher criminal propensity and more likely to commit crimes, 
immigrants are motivated to work hard to avoid deportation (Butcher & Piehl, 2005; 
Sampson, 2008; Tonry, 1997). Scholars found that there is no consistent evidence that 
immigrants are more crime-prone than the natives (Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Hagan and 
Palloni, 1998). Second, immigrants come to the US with their own cultures, and these 
social capitals provide support for them in a new environment to stay away from 
crime (Dinovitzer et al., 2009; Vaughn et al., 20114). For example, Dinovitzer et al. 
(2009) suggested that due to the culture of investment in education in immigrant 
families, especially Asian immigrant families, immigrant youth are less likely to 





school make illegal activities unfavorable and unworthy (Dinovitzer et al., 2009). 
Also, it is possible that less-educated and less-skilled immigrants would not turn to 
criminal activities because they could still obtain economic opportunities in ethnic-
business through their networks, which are prolific in cities with a large immigrant 
population (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Reid et al., 2005; Wilson 1996). Unfortunately, 
these compositional influences cannot be examined using NNCS due to the nature of 
the data. Further efforts in handling this issue will be discussed in the discussion. 
 
Labor Instability as a City Context 
As stated in the “immigrant revitalization perspective,” economic factors, 
especially labor market conditions, could have significant effects on the association 
between immigration and crime at the neighborhood level. Yet, it is crucial to 
consider the economic conditions at the city level. Prior research demonstrated that 
the effects of immigration on crime moderated by city’s immigrant political 
opportunities and by types of immigration destinations (Harris & Fledmeyer, 2013; 
Lyons et al. 2013; Martinez, 2002; Ramey, 2013). For instance, Ramey (2013) found 
immigrant prevalence and growth in immigrant populations have no effects on 
neighborhood crime across various racial/ethnic neighborhoods. But immigrant 
concentration reduces neighborhood violent crime in established destination cities, 
while this inverse relationship only exists in Latino communities in new destination 
cities (Ramey, 2013). Hence, this study brings in another new contextual factor, city 
labor instability, to the study of immigrant-crime nexus because people in 





2003). For example, the labor market conditions in the Guadalupe neighborhood 
much depend on the city around the area - Silicon Valley (Dohan, 2003). Also, cities 
are usually the places where jobs are located, and ethnic enclaves exist, such as 
Chinatown and Little Italy in New York City. Hence, measuring economic conditions 
at the city level could better capture the vitality of the labor market than only 
considering the economic conditions at the neighborhood level. 
I extend the revitalization effects of immigrant concentration to argue that 
economic conditions, especially the labor market, in the city level would change the 
relationship of neighborhood immigrant concentration and crime. In particular, I 
focus on city levels of labor instability and how it moderates the immigration and 
crime relationship. Previous research guides how this moderating relationship might 
work. It may be that cities with significant labor instability undercut the beneficial 
effects of immigrants on neighborhood crime (Xie & Baumer, 2018). Scholars argued 
that the weak economy with limited job opportunities might lead to competition and 
conflicts in the labor market. Friction in labor markets could happen among different 
immigrant groups as well as between immigrants and native workers. Prior studies 
revealed that there were competitions between native-Black and immigrant workers 
in the secondary labor market and that immigrants have led to a significant drop in 
native-Black employment (Reed & Danziger, 2007; Waldinger, 1997). Likewise, 
Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a; 2010b) found that Black violence rises when Blacks 
are competing with Latino immigrants for jobs in the low-skills labor market both in 
urban and rural areas. These frictions will not only break social ties among residents 





commitment to the labor market at the neighborhood level. As social ties weaken, 
informal social controls in the neighborhood will be lessened in such a way that 
neighborhoods are less capable of controlling crime. In this case, I expect that the 
inverse relationship between immigrants and crime will be diminished or become 
insignificant when the city has relatively high labor instability. 
In contrast, cities with relatively high labor instability may enhance the 
protective effect of immigration on crime. Immigrants may be more likely to work 
together and help each other out when all are suffering under the weak economy. As 
stated in the “immigrant revitalization perspective,” immigrants are more likely to 
establish strong social capitals in immigrant concentrated neighborhoods (Lee & 
Martinez, 2002; Martinez, 2006). A major source of social capital is from the 
immigrant family because they tend to have an intact family and pro-family culture 
(Martinez et al., 2004). These mutual trusts, norms, and networks, which are features 
of social capitals, will facilitate collective action to achieve collective success. To 
illustrate, immigrants tend to obtain jobs through their social networks. Dohan’s study 
(2003) demonstrated that Mexicans immigrants are willing to provide employment 
resources and support to their family and friends when they are all living in 
impoverished areas. Also, when there are steady and good quality jobs available, they 
would save these valuable opportunities for their close family members. Their 
commitments to their jobs show that their everyday life much centers on their work, 
so they are strongly tied to the workplace. Also, the attachment to the workplace 
could be enhanced when working with family members. Thus, the ties with the labor 





crime (Crutchfield, 1997; Dohan, 2003; Sampson & Groves, 1989). I anticipate that 
the inverse relationship between neighborhood immigrant concentration and crime 
will be enhanced when the cities are experiencing relatively high labor instability. 
There are various ways that labor instability could relate to neighborhood 
crime. First, according to dual labor market theory, the characteristics of secondary 
sector low-wage jobs, which is the major component of labor instability, is inherently 
affecting one’s criminality (Crutchfield and Pitchford, 1997). In contrast to primary 
occupations that are central to the economy, such as professions, managers, and 
skilled craft workers, secondary occupations are the jobs on the fringe of the economy 
(Crutchfield, 1989). Examples of secondary-sector jobs are domestic servants, and 
waiters and waitresses (Crutchfield, 1989). Secondary sector jobs are poorly paid and 
have a short period of employment, while primary sector jobs are well-paid, skilled, 
and stable. With unstable jobs, secondary sector workers are unable to develop strong 
ties with their workplace and bond with their colleagues. Also, secondary sector 
workers are usually not committed to schools, so they are more likely to be drawn to 
criminal activity. In this case, lack of attachment to the workplace and school was 
found to be a strong predictor of individual criminal behavior as well as community 
cohesiveness (Crutchfield, 1989; Crutchfield and Pitchford, 1997). Thus, labor 
instability has an indirect negative effect on neighborhood stabilization to prevent 
crime. 
Additionally, secondary sector low-wages jobs could also pose positive effects 
on reducing neighborhood crime. When examining the relationship between 





Slack (2008) found that areas with more low-hour and seasonal employment have less 
violent crime in both metro and non-metro areas. They argued that the availability of 
low hour and seasonal jobs could still provide some sort of social regulation on the 
workers because these jobs helped to form conventional activities and socialization 
(Lee & Slack, 2008). Along these lines, limited opportunities to enter the secondary 
sector labor market, where immigrants are most likely to work, may lead to 
disadvantaged living conditions that could force them into criminal activities. 
Previous studies on economy and crime focused on the link between 
unemployment and crime, and evidence showed this relationship is mixed or positive. 
However, unemployment alone may not be the proper measurement of economic 
status. Previous studies demonstrated that labor instability is better capturing the labor 
market conditions, and it is significantly related to crime. Crutchfield and Pitchford 
(1997) found that characteristics of labor markets affect one’s criminality, especially 
for people who experience short-term employment. In addition to job duration, the 
quality of jobs also influenced crime (Allan & Steffensmeier, 1989; Krivo & 
Peterson, 2004; Wadsworth, 2006). Krivo and Peterson (2004) found that the quantity 
and quality of jobs influence neighborhood violent crime, even though the effects 
varied by age. Both quantity and quality of jobs had no impact on teen violence but 
had significant impacts on young adult arrests. Only the quantity of jobs influenced 
violent arrests in older adults (Krivo & Peterson, 2004). Also, Allan and 
Steffensmeier (1989) found that the quality of jobs is more important for adults, while 





A large body of studies substantiated the importance of using secondary sector 
low-wage jobs to indicate labor market condition. However, it is also reasonable to 
include joblessness. Joblessness is measured by the percentage of working age 
population, from 16 to 64, who are unemployed or not in the labor force. I suspect 
that in a feeble labor market, there are higher rates of joblessness because the working 
age population was not able to secure jobs. Altogether, labor instability, which 
consists of secondary sector low-wage jobs and joblessness, is a legitimate 
measurement of precarious labor market conditions. 
 
Gateway Status as an Additional Influence on the Immigration-crime Nexus  
The moderating effects of city labor instability on immigrant prevalence and 
crime are expected to be different between the gateway and non-gateway cities 
because the literature showed that gateways cities with a history of immigration and 
racial/ethnic diversity provide “receptive” contexts for immigrants (Portes & 
Rumbaut, 2006). According to Ramey (2013), “a receptive context is one in which 
the government, labor market, and a large co-ethnic community serve to integrate 
new arrivals socially and economically” (Ramey, 2013:602), and gateway cities 
provide receptive context. Since “ethnic enclaves” are more likely to develop in cities 
with receptive contexts, “enclave economies” may help in preventing crime in 
immigrant neighborhoods through strengthening social ties and exerting informal 
social controls (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Hence, gateway cities are more receptive 
to immigrants and help them to integrate into the neighborhood because in such 





are institutions that help with immigrant integration; and (3) these cities provide 
employment opportunities (Velez & Lyons, 2012).  
Evidence from previous studies upholds the argument that immigrants have 
revitalizing effects on neighborhood crime when looking at cities with a long history 
of immigration, for instance, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Miami (Graif & 
Sampson, 2009, Kubrin et al., 2018, Lee & Martinez, 2002). Assessing the 
relationship between immigrants and violent crime, Ramey (2013) examined how this 
relationship differs depending on the varying receptive contexts of gateway and non-
gateway cities. He found that the association between immigration and violent crime 
varies significantly depending on gateway status. Gateway cities have substantially 
lower rates of violent crime than non-gateway cities. Given the moderating influence 
of a city’s gateway status, I expect that the moderating effect of labor instability will 
be different between gateway and non-gateway city. Since gateway cities provide 
receptive contexts that help to integrate immigrants, the moderating effect of labor 
instability should be significant in gateway cities but not in non-gateway cities. 
The current study aims to extend and fill the gap of the moderating influence 
of economic conditions on the immigration-crime nexus in prior research. I aim to 
analyze how the association between neighborhood immigration and crime, both 
violent and property crime, is moderated by city labor instability, and whether this 
moderating effect varies by city’s gateway status. The research questions are: (1) Do 
unfavorable economic conditions, captured by city levels of labor instability, 





this moderation effect of labor instability on the immigration-crime relationship differ 







Chapter 3: Data and Method 
Sample 
I utilize the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS), which was 
collected by Peterson and Krivo (2010b). These data include socio-demographic 
information and official crime data from a sample of U.S. cities with a population of 
100,000 and above for the year 2000. Crime data in the NNCS were obtained directly 
from the local police department and are connected to the neighborhood (census 
tract). Detailed socio-demographic information is obtained from U.S. census data. 
The original sample consists of 91 cities and 9,593 neighborhoods (census tracts). 
Sampled cities in the data are meant to be representative of medium to large cities in 
the U.S. (Peterson & Krivo, 2010a). These cities are distributed throughout the U.S. 
within the Northeast and the Midwest combined, the South, and the West. The final 
sample for the model is 8,931 census tracts across 87 cities due to missing data for 
violent crime. It is more likely to generalize results across urban neighborhoods 
throughout the country using data with such a large sample. The unit of analysis is 
census tracts, and this is the measure of the neighborhood. Lastly, the NNCS is the 
appropriate data because it includes variables of interest, and they were measured at 
both the neighborhood level and the city level. To implement a cross-level model, it is 
necessary to have such data, and there are a great number of studies that used NNCS 
for multi-level analysis (Lyons et al., 2013; Peterson & Krivo, 2010a; Ramey, 2013; 








In this study, I examined both violent crime and property crime at the tract 
level. The measures of violent crime are the three-year average count (1999-2001) of 
homicide and robberies. Homicide is the most severe and reliable violent crime 
measurement, and robbery is a common violent crime in the metropolitan area even 
though it is a less reliable measure in official crime data  (Lyons et al., 2013). Also, 
the measurement of violent crime with homicide and robbery was widely used in 
former immigration and crime studies (Lyons et al., 2013; Peterson & Krivo, 2010a; 
Reid et al., 2005). Similarly, property crime is measured by the three-year average 
count (1999-2001) of burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle theft. Following 
previous literature, property crime includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft 
to capture a variety of property crime (Kubrin et al., 2018; Peterson & Krivo, 2010a).  
 
Key Independent Variables 
Tract-Level. 
Immigrant prevalence. The immigrant concentration is measured by an index 
( = 0.96) calculated by the average of the standard scores of three variables related 
to immigrants: percentage foreign-born, percentage of recent immigrants, and 
percentage linguistically isolated. Scholars studying similar topics used similar 
measurements (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Lyons, Velez, & Santoro, 2013).  
Scholars have operationalized the concentration of immigrants in various 
ways, such as with percent foreign-born or an index that contains variables related to 





measurements is that they treat immigrants as a homogeneous population because 
research showed that different immigrant groups have different effect on crime 
(Kubrin et al., 2018). However, a meta-analysis on variability in measuring 
immigration found that different measurements of immigration do not produce a 
significant impact on the immigration-crime association for macro-level analysis 
(Ousey and Kubrin, 2018). Also, Lyons and his colleagues (2013) demonstrated that 
alternative measures produce similar results on crime after running sensitivity 
analyses for the immigrant prevalence and other single-item and index measurements. 
Thus, I use the immigrant prevalence index as my key independent variable. 
 
City-Level. 
Labor Instability1. Labor instability refers to an unsteady labor market that is a 
result of unfavorable economic conditions in the city. Following previous studies 
(Crutchfield et al., Unpublished), I created a measure of labor instability to capture 
economic conditions at the city level. Labor instability is a standardized index (α = 
0.79) combining the percentage of secondary sector workers and the percentage of 
joblessness. The percentage of secondary sector workers is measured by the percent 
of the total employed civilian population age 16 and older employed in the six 
occupations with the lowest mean incomes in the year of the data collected. From 
2000 census data, the six secondary sector low-wage occupations are: (1) health care 
 
1 I considered individual moderating influences of percent secondary sector workers and percent 
joblessness on the immigration-crime association. These two measures produce very similar interaction 
effects, and the results of the models stay the same (Table 7 & Table 8). Hence, I decided to use the 






support, (2) food preparation and serving occupations, (3) building/grounds 
cleaning/maintenance workers, (4) personal care and service, (5) farming, fishing, and 
forestry, and (6) material moving. The percentage of joblessness is the percentage of 
civilian labor force that are working age (16-64) who are unemployed or not in the 
labor force.  
 Gateway status. I create a dichotomous indicator for all the cities in the 
sample, where one means gateway cities, and zero means non-gateway cities. 
Gateways are cities with metropolitan populations greater than one million and a long 
history of immigrant settlement or that experienced fast immigrant population growth 
between 1990 and 2000 (Singer, 2004). Singer (2004) indicates various types of 
gateways, but I decided to include cities, which are available in the sample, that were 
mentioned in all types of gateways except former gateways. Therefore, former 
gateway cities are coded as non-gateway cities. The reason to exclude the former 
gateways is because they are cities that once attracted immigrants in the early 1990s, 
but they no longer do so. They are unlikely to provide receptive contexts for 
immigrants since they are no longer used to them entering the city, possibly losing 
their protective effects when investigating immigration-crime relationships. Thus, 
former gateways defined by Singer (2004) are not regarded as gateways in this 
analysis. Using Singer’s (2004) definition and categories of gateways, I classify the 
following 19 cities as gateway cities: Austin, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas, 
Denver, Fort Worth, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, Oakland, Phoenix, 
Portland, San Bernardino, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, Washington, DC. All other 








Following previous studies and especially Peterson and Krivo (2010) and in 
line with social disorganization arguments (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & 
McKay, 1942), measures of residential mobility, neighborhood disadvantage, and 
racial heterogeneity are established predictors of neighborhood crime and should be 
included in the models as control variables.  
Residential instability. This measure is based on the average of the standard 
scores for two related variables ( = 0.69): percent renters and percent movers. The 
percentage of renters is the percentage of occupied housing units that are occupied by 
renters, and the percentage of movers is the percentage of the population aged five 
and above who lived in a different house five years ago (in 1995).  
Neighborhood disadvantage. The neighborhood disadvantage index ( = 
0.93) combines the average of the standardized scores of six variables: percentage of 
high school graduates (reverse coded), jobless rate, percentage of professionals and 
managers (reverse coded), percentage of female-headed households, percentage of 
secondary sector low-wage jobs, and living below the poverty line. This index has 
been widely used in previous research that used NNCS for studies in neighborhood 
and crime (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Ramey, 2013).  
Racial heterogeneity. In terms of racial/ethnic diversity at the neighborhood 
level, I created four dichotomous indicators for four types of ethnic-racial 





American, predominantly Latino, predominantly minority, and integrated. The 
predominantly white neighborhood is the reference group. One signifies the 
neighborhoods have 70 percent or more specific ethno-racial group, and otherwise 
coded as zero.  
Besides the variables that are related to neighborhood crime according to 
social disorganization theory (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942), I 
also consider other control variables following previous literature (Peterson & Krivo, 
2010).  
Residential loans. This variable measures the total amount of loans that were 
originated, approved but not accepted, or denied by financial institutions. 
Percent young male. This variable is the percentage of young males in the 
population that are aged between 15 to 34. 
Spatial Lags. Spatial lags are the average violent crime and property crime 
counts for Census tracts that are geographically adjacent to the target tract. They are 
constructed by multiplying tract characteristics by a row standardized first-order 
spatial contiguity matrix which uses a queen criterion (Peterson & Krivo, 2009; 
Peterson & Krivo, 2010b). 
 
City-level. 
Following Peterson and Krivo (2010a), I also included a number of measures 






Percent manufacturing. This variable is the percentage of employed people 
who work in the manufacturing industries in 2000 and at least 16 years old. Previous 
research stated that cities with a stronger manufacturing base have a lower level of 
violent crime (Peterson & Krivo, 2010a). Since these cities tend to have sufficient 
economic resources, such as good jobs and substantial tax, to invest in local 
communities and public services, there are more supports from police and 
conventional opportunities that prevent residents from engaging in criminal activities 
(Peterson & Krivo, 2010a). This variable was used as a proxy for the macroeconomic 
character of cities, to investigate the sole effect of labor market condition on crime, it 
is necessary to control percent manufacturing.   
City population. This variable indicates the city population at 2000. 
Percent recent movers. This variable is the percentage of a city’s population 
ages 5 and over who moved in 1995.  
Percent African American. This variable is the percentage of the total 
population that is non-Hispanic Black.  
Percent Hispanic. This variable is the percentage of the total population that is 
Hispanic. 
Percent foreign born. This variable is the percentage of the total city 
population that is foreign-born.  
Percent young males. This variable is the percentage of young males in the 
population that are aged between 15 to 34.  
White/Black Segregation. This variable indicates the racial segregation 





Region. There are three dummy variables that indicates which region of the 
cities is located in the U.S. They are Midwest, South, and West. Northeast is the 
reference group.  
 
Analytical Strategy 
To assess how the city-level labor instability moderates the nexus between 
immigration and crime at the neighborhood level, I estimate hierarchical generalized 
linear models (HGLM) with tracts as level-one units and city as level-two units. 
Tracts are nested within cities. According to literature, there are two reasons to fit a 
negative binomial model in a HGLM framework (Lyons et al. 2013; Ramey, 2013; 
Velez & Lyons, 2012). First, the dependent variables are counts on violent crime and 
property crime, and they are rare events within small units (census tracts). Second, to 
control for over-dispersion in the tract level (level-one) variance, a negative binomial 
model was used instead of a Poisson model, which is a model usually used for count 
outcomes. I also specify the crime counts with exposure of population at the tract 
level, which is the same as analyzing crime rates across the neighborhoods (Osgood, 
2000). To explore whether the nexus between immigrant prevalence and crime at the 
neighborhood level varied across cities, I allow random variation in the slope of 
immigrant prevalence. Lastly, I estimate separate models for violent and property 
crime, and for gateway and non-gateway cities. The following equations are HGLM 








𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝜷𝒊𝒋𝑿𝒊𝒋 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 (1) 
 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝑟00 + 𝑟01𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝒓𝟎𝒋𝑾𝒋 + 𝑢0𝑗 (2) 
 
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝑟10 + 𝑟11(𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 × 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 (3) 
 
In the above equations, i stands for level one units – neighborhoods or census 
tracts,  j represents level two units – cities, 𝑿𝒊𝒋 indicates explanatory variables at the 
neighborhood level, and 𝑾𝒋 indicates explanatory variables at the city level. Equation 
(1) shows the estimation at the neighborhood level of 𝑌𝑖𝑗 which is the predicted 
number of crimes, either violent crime count or property crime counts. 𝛽0𝑗 is a 
constant, 𝛽1𝑗 is the estimated coefficient of immigrant prevalence, 𝜷𝒊𝒋 is the estimated 
coefficients of all other tract-level control variables, and 𝑟𝑖𝑗 represents the between 
neighborhood variation in crime. Equation (2) provides the estimation at the city level 
of 𝛽0𝑗 , which is the constant in equation (1). 𝑟00 is a constant, 𝑟01 is the estimated 
coefficient of city labor instability, 𝒓𝟎𝒋 indicates the estimated coefficient of all other 
city-level control variables, and 𝑢0𝑗 represents the between city variation in crime.  
Equation (3) is a cross-level interaction model of tract-level and city-level 
estimations. To estimate 𝛽1𝑗 in Equation (1), 𝑟10 is a constant, and 𝑟11 is the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term of neighborhood immigrant prevalence and city 
labor instability. Here, 𝑢1𝑗 is the variation in the effect of 𝑿𝒊𝒋 on 𝑌𝑖𝑗. This allows the 





Chapter 4: Results 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
study. Neighborhoods, on average, have about 15 violent crime incidents and 217 
property crime incidents. Turning to the key tract-level independent variable, since it 
is an index, I will discuss its components. On average, 16.32% of the people are 
foreign-born, 7.52% of them are recent immigrants, and 7.7% of them are 
linguistically isolated in the neighborhoods in the sample. The average level of labor 
instability, the key city-level independent variable, is also close to zero with a range 
from -2.69 to 2.99. Lastly, there are 19 gateway cities, and 4,374 (48.98%) census 
tracts are in these cities. 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in 
parentheses for separate multilevel models for violent crime. Consistent with previous 
research (Ousey& Kubrin, 2018), model 1 shows that neighborhoods with greater 
immigrant prevalence had fewer serious reported crimes. When holding all else 
constant, for every unit increases in immigrant prevalence, a neighborhood’s mean 
violent crime decreases by 11.2%. Model 3 provides data on the moderating effect of 
labor instability on the association between neighborhood immigrant concentration 
and violent crime. As I expected, cities’ labor market conditions significantly 
moderated the relationship between immigrant prevalence and violent crime at the 
neighborhood level. After considering cities’ labor instability, for every unit increases 
in immigrant prevalence, a neighborhood’s mean violent crime decreases by 12.2% 
(one percent more than model 1). In cities that experience labor instability the inverse 





The variance components of immigrant prevalence is also significant. This means that 
the level of neighborhood immigrant prevalence varies substantially across cities.  
 
Figure 1. Predicted Effect of Immigrant Prevalence on Violent Crime by Level 
of City Labor Instability 
 
 
Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the statistically significant interaction 
from Model 3 in Table 3. Recall that this interaction shows that the protective 
influence of immigration against violent crime is fueled as the city’s labor instability 
worsens. The solid line marked by triangles represents the predicted effect of 
immigrant prevalence on violent crime in cities with high labor instability, indicating 
a weak labor market condition. The negative slope is quite steep and reaches the 
lowest predicted level of violent crime at high levels of immigrant presence. 





cities with weak labor market conditions. In contrast, the line marked by diamonds, 
shows that in cities with low city labor instability, considered a robust economy, the 
inverse effect of immigrant presence on violent crime is diminished. That is, the 
number of violent crimes were relatively unchanged by immigration for 
neighborhood in cities with a healthy labor market.  
The next set of analyses explore whether the moderating effect of labor 
instability varies by gateway status. Table 4 presents estimates of the HGLM models 
separately for gateway and non-gateway cities. As mentioned above, since gateway 
cities provide receptive contexts for immigrants, and ethnic businesses are more 
likely to thrive in gateway cities, I expect that labor instability will only moderate the 
immigrant-crime nexus in gateway cities. Surprisingly, labor instability significantly 
moderated the association between immigrant prevalence and violent crime at the 
neighborhood level for both gateway and non-gateway cities (Table 4). Despite 
gateways status, for every unit increases in immigrant prevalence, a neighborhood’s 
mean violent crime decreases by 11.6% in gateway cities, and 13.3% in non-gateway 












Figure 2. Predicted Effect of Immigrant Prevalence on Violent Crime by Level 
of City Labor Instability in Gateway Cities 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted Effect of Immigrant Prevalence on Violent Crime by Level 








 Figure 2 and 3 show how the interaction plays out by city’s gateway status. As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, city labor instability is significantly moderating the 
immigration-violent crime association at the neighborhood level regardless of 
gateway status. This interaction effect seems exclusively beneficial for neighborhoods 
in gateway cities with an unstable labor market. Interestingly, for gateway cities that 
are performing well, a higher level of immigrant prevalence is related to more violent 
crime. For non-gateway cities (Figure 3), neighborhood violent crime generally 
decreased with increasing immigrant populations across various levels of city labor 
instability. However, for cities with low city labor instability, violent crimes are 
unaffected or slightly raised with increasing levels of immigrant presence. 
Turning to property crime which is demonstrated in Table 5, the baseline 
model for property crime (Model 4) shows that immigrant prevalence is inversely 
related to neighborhood crime, as suggested by prior studies (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). 
When holding all else constant, for every unit increases in immigrant prevalence, a 
neighborhood’s mean property crime decreases by 13.7%. However, unlike violent 
crime, labor instability does not significantly moderate the immigrant-property crime 
relationship (Model 6). Regardless of how the cities’ labor market is behaving, a 
higher concentration of immigrants is related to less property crime at the 
neighborhood level. Moreover, the interaction effect of labor instability is also not 
statistically significant for property crime in both gateway and non-gateway cities 
(Table 6). The level of immigrant prevalence is inversely related to neighborhood 





Together, findings from the multilevel analyses suggest that labor instability 
at the city level significantly moderate the relationship between immigration and 
violent crime, but not property crime. For cities that have a relatively higher level of 
labor instability, immigrants might work together to fight against economic hardship, 
strengthening social ties and social control. In turn, this revitalization of community 
social organization likely produces a reduction of neighborhood violent crime, and 






Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
Immigration and crime have been widely studied, and past research shows that 
immigration either have no effect on crime or reduce neighborhood crime (Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2018). In this study, I set out to explore the ways in which the labor market 
condition at the city level influences the immigrant-crime nexus at the neighborhood 
level. The "immigrant revitalization perspective" argued that immigration reduces 
crime through strengthening social ties and stimulating the local economy (Martinez 
et al., 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). I highlight the role of labor instability as a 
moderator on the influence of immigration and serious reported crime. Focusing on 
the economic aspect, I anticipate labor instability will moderate the association 
between immigrant concentration and crime, both violent and property crime. High 
labor instability could diminish the negative relationship between immigration and 
crime by weakening social ties and informal social control, which is due to conflicts 
and competition in the labor market (Reed & Danziger, 2007; Shihadeh & Barranco, 
2010a; Waldinger, 1997). In contrast, in cities with a higher amount of labor 
instability, the beneficial effect of immigration on crime could be bolstered through 
strong social capitals among immigrants, which facilitate collective action in 
preventing neighborhood crime (Martinez et al., 2010; Sampson, 2008). To explore 
these ideas, I investigated the moderating effect of city labor instability on the 
immigration-crime relationship. I also explore how this cross-level interaction effect 
is shaped by a city’s status as an immigrant gateway city. 
To address my research questions, I employ multilevel analysis using negative 





analyses show support that city labor instability has a significant impact on the 
immigration-crime relationship at the neighborhood level, but only for violent crime. 
In a city with high labor instability, a higher prevalence of immigrants in the 
neighborhood is related to fewer neighborhood violent crime incidents compared to a 
city with a stable labor market. This significant interaction effect means that the 
beneficial effect of immigration on crime is greater in cities undergoing economic 
hardship. Immigrants may build stronger ties and help each other out when all of 
them are suffering under an unsteady labor market. Since immigrants tend to form 
strong social capitals in immigrant concentrated neighborhoods, the mutual trust and 
attendant networks would help to bring out collective actions in preventing 
neighborhood crime (Lee & Martinez, 2002; Martinez, 2006; Martinez et al., 2004). 
In contrast to findings on violent crime, immigration reduces property crime no 
matter how the city’s labor market is performing. For the second research question, 
the results show that the moderating effect of city labor instability is substantial for 
gateway and non-gateway cities, but this significant interaction effect is only 
pertinent for violent crime and not property crime. Because gateway cities provide a 
“receptive context,” I anticipated that the interaction effect should be different for 
gateways and non-gateways. Nevertheless, gateway status is inconsequential for the 
moderating effect of city labor instability, which is only meaningful to violent crime 
but not property crime. 
What are the implications of these findings and research on immigration and 
crime? First, little research has considered how economic status at the city level 





study fills the gap in the literature by investigating how city economic conditions 
moderate the inverse relationship between immigration and crime at the 
neighborhood level. Secondly, previous studies demonstrated the importance of 
considering the city context, especially gateway status (Ramey, 2013; Velez & Lyons, 
2012). By bringing in this new idea, this study widens the current understanding of 
immigration-crime nexus and shows the significance of connecting macro-level 
factors with a micro-level relationship, which is meaningful in neighborhood studies 
(Sampson, 1988; Sampson, 1991). Lastly, this study uncovers the way in which a 
city's conditions fuel the revitalization process of immigration on neighborhood 
crime. It sheds light on a city's economic status and demonstrates that the 
revitalization process greatly depends on how a city’s labor market is performing. 
Important limitations on the data, measurement, and other methodological 
issues in this study should be discussed. First, the crime data used in the analyses are 
official crime data collected from police departments. These data may result in 
underestimation due to underreporting, and this is one of the biggest limitations in 
immigration and crime literature (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). Especially for the 
immigrant population, they might prefer not to report crime when they distrust the 
criminal justice system due to former experience (Xie et al., 2018), or when their 
immigrant statuses are illegal (Kubrin, 2013). However, this is less of an issue in 
gateway cities. A study showed that violence in traditional immigrant counties is not 
underreported when controlling individual and neighborhood conditions because 
immigrants in those places have minor impediments in the process of seeking police 





investigate the compositional effect of immigration on crime, and how this 
relationship would be influenced by city labor instability. A possible solution could 
be using crime victimization data (e.g., National Crime Victimization Survey) 
because they have individual-level data and cover crimes that are not reported to the 
police.  
Secondly, labor instability is measured by secondary sector low-wage jobs 
and joblessness in the current study. However, there might be other ways to 
operationalize labor market conditions, such as measuring both supply and demand 
side of the employment and duration of jobs. With a comprehensive measure of the 
labor market, it is possible to find a more substantial support for the significant 
interaction effect of labor instability. Third, the current study did not control policing 
activities in the analyses. Previous research showed that local police resources could 
affect crime reporting. After controlling police force size, expenditures, and the 
likelihood of police notification over time, immigrants in neighborhoods with high 
immigrant concentration are less likely to report violent crimes in a new immigrant 
destination than in an established immigrant destination (Xie & Baumer, 2019). 
Future research should make efforts to take policing into consideration. Lastly, the 
data used in this study is cross-sectional. Same as other social factors and policy 
implementation, it is noteworthy that labor market conditions take time to perform its 
influences. The beneficial interaction effect of labor instability may be stronger in the 
later years, which is not captured in the NNCS. Or the interaction effect of the labor 






Through this study, I offer three avenues for future research. First, a meta-
analysis on immigration and crime literature found that the immigration-crime 
relationship is greatly depending on the destination context. There are various ways to 
operationalize gateway status or established destinations (Ramey, 2013; Singer, 2004; 
Velez & Lyons, 2012; Xie & Baumer, 2018). Even though I did not find significant 
differences between the gateway and non-gateway cities for the interaction effect of 
labor instability, future research should explore other categories of immigrant 
destinations. Second, this study focuses on macro-level immigration-crime 
relationship, which includes contextual factors at the neighborhood level and the city 
level. However, it is also crucial to investigate how these macro-level influencers 
would affect individuals. A potential research question could be how the immigrant-
crime relationship at the neighborhood level will mediate the impact of city labor 
market conditions on individual criminal behavior. Third, my measure of labor 
instability only covers the legal labor market. Yet, scholarship shows that immigrants 
often turn to employment opportunities that are “under the table” or illegal. For 
instance, Dohan (2003) shows that some of the immigrants he studied turned to illegal 
jobs like drug trading when there were limited job opportunities or the jobs are poorly 
paid. A further step from this study could explore how prevalent illegal or 
underground economics shape the immigration-crime relationship. 
In conclusion, this research shows that the role of city labor instability in 
explaining the relationship between immigrant prevalence and neighborhood violent 
crime. Thus, the immigration and crime story is not one that can be told from solely 





neighborhoods within cities and particularly their labor market conditions. Future 
studies should build on findings from this study to explore the impact of other cities’ 
contextual factors, including labor market conditions, on not only immigration and 
crime studies but also expand to neighborhood and crime research. If immigrants still 
produce beneficial effects on reducing neighborhood violent crime when suffering 
under a weak labor market, we might want to introduce immigrants into economically 
deprived cities to control crime. Stakeholders and policymakers could increase 
immigrant political opportunities in these cities to attract immigrants, so these cities 
are more likely to retain the revitalization effect of immigration on violent crime. To 
ensure favorable outcomes, they can also consider deploying more resources to 









Table 1. Descriptive Statistic of All Variables 
  Mean SD  Min. Max 
Tract Level (N = 8,931)     
Violent Crime Count (1999 to 2001) 15.47 16.99 0.00 337.00 
Property Crime Count (1999 to 2001) 216.90 187.70 0.00 3320.00 
Immigrant Prevalence 0.00 0.96 -0.87 5.03 
Percent foreign born 16.32 16.43 0.00 83.78 
Percent recent immigrants 7.52 8.49 0.00 61.68 
Percent linguistically isolated  7.70 10.71 0.00 72.99 
Residential stability 0.03 0.87 -2.14 2.74 
Neighborhood disadvantage  0.00 0.86 -1.66 3.70 
Percent high school graduates  74.91 18.00 14.12 100.00 
Percent female-headed households 17.04 11.86 0.00 96.06 
Percent poverty 18.51 14.01 0.00 92.69 
Jobless rate 33.89 13.13 5.01 90.95 
Percent professionals 31.94 16.93 0.00 86.48 
Percent low-wage jobs  18.52 9.03 0.00 82.48 
Percent young males aged 15-34 15.87 5.75 0.00 55.92 
Residential loans 21372.00 25316.00 0.00 521109.00 
African American Neighborhoods 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Latino Neighborhoods 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Minority Neighborhoods 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Integrated  Neighborhoods 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Spatial Lags for violent crime  48.80 38.30 0.00 354.00 
Spatial Lags for property crime  68.39 51.47 0.10 740.46 
 
    
City Level (N = 87)     
Labor Instability 0.00 0.91 -2.69 2.99 
City population (per 100,000) at 2000 10.86 11.39 1.01 36.95 
Percent manufacturing at 2000 11.94 4.05 1.53 25.86 
Percent recent movers 51.94 5.40 31.93 66.52 
Percent African American 24.05 17.99 0.53 81.02 
Percent Hispanic 20.81 16.58 1.09 90.46 
Percent foreign born 17.28 12.28 1.58 72.11 
Percent young males aged 15-34 16.43 1.97 11.24 24.09 
White-Black Dissimilarity at 2000 59.66 16.61 14.28 85.19 





South 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
West 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 




























Table 2. Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Operationalization 
Dependent Variables  
  Violent crimes  
Average annual number of reported murders and robberies in tract 
from 1999 to 2001 
  Property crimes  
Average annual number of reported burglaries, larcenies, and 
motor vehicle theft in tract from 1999 to 2001 
  
Independent Variables   
Tract Level (N = 8,931)  
  Immigrant Prevalence (𝜶 = 0.96) Average of standard scores of the following three variables: 
 Percentage of the total population that is foreign born  
 
Percentage of the total population that is foreign born and arrived 
in the United States in 1990 or later 
 
Percentage of the households in which no one age fourteen and 
over speaks English well 
  Residential instability (𝜶 = 0.69) Average of standard scores of the following two variables: 
 Percentage of occupied housing units that are renter occupied 
 
Percentage of population ages 5 and over who lived in a different 
house in 1995 
  Disadvantage (𝜶 = 0.93) Average of standard scores of the following six variables: 
 
Percentage of civilian labor force age 16-64 who are unemployed 
or not in the labor force (joblessness) 
 
Percentage of employed civilian population age 16 and over in 
management, professional, & related occupations (reverse-coded 
in index) 
 
Percentage of adults age 25 and over who are at least high school 
graduates (reverse-coded in index) 
 Percentage of households that are female-headed with no husband  
 
Percentage of employed civilian population age 16 and over 
employed in the six occupations with the lowest average incomes 
(low-wage jobs) 
 
Percentage of population for whom poverty status is determined 
whose income in 1999 was below the poverty level  
  
City Level (N = 87)  
  Labor Instability (𝜶 = 0.79) Average of the standard scores of two metropolitan variables: 
 
Percentage of employed civilian population age 16 and over 
employed in the six occupations with the lowest average incomes 
(low-wage jobs) 
 
Percentage of civilian labor force age 16-64 who are unemployed 







Table 3. HGLM Negative Binomial Models of Violent Crime with Robust S.E. 
 Violent Crime 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)       
Immigrant Prevalence -.122** (.034) -.112** (.034) -.122** (.034) 
Residential Mobility .283** (.024) .282** (.024) .282** (.024) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  .344** (.040) .343** (.041) .342** (.041) 
% Young Male (15-34) .005 (.003) .006 (.003) .005 (.003) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
.262** (.084) .264** (.085) .256** (.084) 
Latino Neighborhoods .196 (.111) .198 (.111) .201 (.112) 
Minority Neighborhoods  .247 (.091) .248** (.091) .246** (.090) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .278** (.047) .279** (.048) .277** (.047) 
Spatial Lag .010* (.001) .010* (.001) .010** (.001) 
       
City-level (N=87)       
Labor Instability - - .028 (.061) .029 (.061) 
Immigrant Prevalence x 
Labor Instability 
- - - - -.053** (.018) 
White-Black Dissimilarity .016** (.003) .015** (.003) .015** (.003) 
% Manufacturing -.015* (.007) -.061* (.008) -.016* (.008) 
City population -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
% African American .009** (.002) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) 
% Hispanic .006 (.003) .004 (.004) .004 (.004) 
% Recent movers -.006 (.008) -.005 (.008) -.006 (.008) 
% Foreign born -.005 (.005) -.004 (.005) -.004 (.005) 
%  Young Male (15-34) .005 (.020) .004 (.020) .004 (.020) 
Midwest .134 (.102) .155 (.113) .165 (.116) 
South .019 (.092) .040 (.114) .048 (.117) 
West .285** (.108) .290** (.111) .291** (.113) 
Constant -7.266** (.477) -7.231** (.481) -7.169** (.489) 
Variance Components        
Immigrant Prevalence .020** (.005) .019** (.005) .014** (.005) 
Intercept .055** (.011) .056** (.011) .057** (.011) 












Table 4.  HGLM Negative Binomial Models of Violent Crime with by Gateway 
Status 
 Violent Crime 
 Gateway Non-Gateway 
 b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)     
Immigrant Prevalence -.116** (.046) -.133** (.041) 
Residential Mobility .282** (.040) .258** (.030) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  .300** (.065) .363** (.044) 
% Young Male (15-34) .006 (.004) .006 (.005) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
.317* (.154) .239** (.103) 
Latino Neighborhoods .253 (.154) .178 (.102) 
Minority Neighborhoods  .296* (.133) .275** (.099) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .280** (.076) .278** (.061) 
Spatial Lag .009* (.002) .011* (.001) 
     
City-level (N=87)     
Labor Instability .073 (.134) -.072 (.069) 
Immigrant Prevalence x 
Labor Instability 
-.081* (.039) -.046* (.020) 
White-Black Dissimilarity -.024* (.012) .018** (.003) 
% Manufacturing -.048* (.021) -.010 (.008) 
City population .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
% African American -.002 (.007) .008* (.003) 
% Hispanic -.009 (.008) .008 (.005) 
% Recent movers -.087 (.057) -.004 (.008) 
% Foreign born .008 (.007) -.003 (.007) 
%  Young Male (15-34) .037 (.081) .008 (.020) 
Midwest .454** (.155) .076 (.122) 
South .435 (.381) -.019 (.130) 
West -.002 (.207) .330** (.126) 
Constant -.518 (2.836) -7.539** (.509) 
Variance Components      
Immigrant Prevalence .009** (.004) .025** (.011) 
Intercept .012** (.004) .043** (.011) 












Table 5. HGLM Negative Binomial Models of Property Crime with Robust S.E. 
 Property Crime 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)       
Immigrant Prevalence -.137** (.035) -.119** (.030) -.120** (.030) 
Residential Mobility .279** (.022) .225** (.019) .225** (.019) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  .043 (.056) .074 (.048) .074 (.049) 
% Young Male (15-34) .008** (.003) .007** (.003) .007* (.003) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
-.069 (.076) .035 (.088) .035 (.088) 
Latino Neighborhoods -.024 (.089) -.016 (.102) -.016 (.102) 
Minority Neighborhoods  -.039 (.105) .040 (.087) .040 (.087) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .091* (.043) .116** (.041) .116** (.041) 
Spatial Lag .005** (.000) .005** (.000) .005** (.000) 
       
City-level (N=87)       
Labor Instability - - .006 (.041) .007 (.041) 
Immigrant Prevalence x 
Labor Instability 
- - - - -.003 (.017) 
White-Black Dissimilarity .006* (.003) .004 (.002) .004 (.002) 
% Manufacturing -.008 (.006) -.008 (.006) -.008 (.005) 
City population -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
% African American -.003 (.002) -.000 (.002) -.000 (.002) 
% Hispanic -.011** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) 
% Recent movers .004 (.007) .001 (.006) .001 (.006) 
% Foreign born -.018** (.004) -.011** (.003) -.011** (.003) 
%  Young Male (15-34) -.011 (.022) -.007 (.016) -.007 (.016) 
Midwest .303** (.076) .208** (.071) .214** (.070) 
South .226** (.074) .160* (.074) .164** (.074) 
West .151 (.095) .116 (.077) .120 (.077) 
Constant -3.533** (.370) -3.507** (.312) -3.499** (.311) 
Variance Components        
Immigrant Prevalence .028** (.007) .012** (.004) .012** (.004) 
Intercept .045** (.009) .026** (.006) .026** (.006) 












Table 6.  HGLM Negative Binomial Models of Property Crime with by Gateway 
Status 
 Property Crime 
 Gateway Non-Gateway 
 b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)     
Immigrant Prevalence -.068* (.034) -.187** (.040) 
Residential Mobility .216** (.028) .233** (.025) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  -.014 (.078) .154** (.041) 
% Young Male (15-34) .005 (.005) .009* (.004) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
.221 (.158) -.088 (.079) 
Latino Neighborhoods .080 (.155) .026 (.121) 
Minority Neighborhoods  .164 (.146) -.023 (.081) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .176** (.064) .059 (.046) 
Spatial Lag .006** (.001) .005** (.001) 
     
City-level (N=87)     
Labor Instability -.083 (.093) -.055 (.049) 
Immigrant Prevalence x 
Labor Instability 
.016 (.023) -.024 (.022) 
White-Black Dissimilarity -.022** (.006) .004 (.003) 
% Manufacturing -.026* (.013) -.003 (.006) 
City population -.000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
% African American -.015** (.004) .001 (.002) 
% Hispanic .003 (.004) .013** (.003) 
% Recent movers -.111** (.028) .003 (.007) 
% Foreign born -.004 (.004) -.015** (.005) 
%  Young Male (15-34) .072 (.048) -.004 (.021) 
Midwest .396** (.119) .165* (.080) 
South .701** (.221) .080 (.080) 
West .176 (.166) .025 (.089) 
Constant 2.981* (1.381) -3.750** (.372) 
Variance Components      
Immigrant Prevalence .006 (.003) .021** (.007) 
Intercept .004 (.002) .027** (.007) 










Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis for Secondary Sector Low-wage Job 
 Violent Crime Property Crime 
 b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)     
Immigrant Prevalence .150 (.109) -.064 (.100) 
Residential Mobility .282** (.024) .225** (.019) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  .342** (.040) .073 (.048) 
% Young Male (15-34) .005 (.003) .007* (.003) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000* (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
.258** (.084) .034 (.088) 
Latino Neighborhoods .200 (.111) -.015 (.102) 
Minority Neighborhoods  .248** (.090) .040 (.087) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .278** (.047) .116** (.041) 
Spatial Lag .010** (.001) .005** (.000) 
     
City-level (N=87)     
Low-wage Jobs .010 (.017) .005 (.012) 
Immigrant Prevalence x  
Low-wage Jobs 
-.016* (.006) -.003 (.006) 
White-Black Dissimilarity .015** (.003) .004 (.002) 
% Manufacturing -.017* (.008) -.009 (.005) 
City population -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
% African American .008* (.002) -.001 (.002) 
% Hispanic .004 (.004) .007** (.002) 
% Recent movers -.005 (.008) .002 (.006) 
% Foreign born -.003 (.005) -.010** (.003) 
%  Young Male (15-34) .002 (.020) -.008 (.016) 
Midwest .150 (.108) .213** (.064) 
South .040 (.109) .168* (.073) 
West .286** (.110) .118 (.078) 
Constant -7.332** (.533) -3.558** (.334) 
Variance Components      
Immigrant Prevalence .016** (.005) .012** (.004) 
Intercept -1.077** (.045) -1.138** (.048) 










Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis for Joblessness 
 Violent Crime Property Crime 
 b (SE) b (SE) 
Tract-level (N=8,931)     
Immigrant Prevalence .154 (.110) -.146 (.091) 
Residential Mobility .282** (.024) .225** (.019) 
Neighborhood Disadvantage  .343** (.041) .074 (.048) 
% Young Male (15-34) .005 (.003) .007* (.003) 
Residential loans -.000** (.000) -.000** (.000) 
African American 
Neighborhoods  
.255** (.084) .035 (.088) 
Latino Neighborhoods .200 (.112) -.017 (.102) 
Minority Neighborhoods  .244** (.090) .040 (.086) 
Integrated Neighborhoods .275** (.047) .116** (.041) 
Spatial Lag .010** (.001) .005** (.000) 
     
City-level (N=87)     
Joblessness .002 (.011) -.003 (.007) 
Immigrant Prevalence x  
Joblessness 
-.008** (.003) .001 (.003) 
White-Black Dissimilarity .016** (.003) .004* (.002) 
% Manufacturing -.015* (.007) -.008 (.005) 
City population -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
% African American .008** (.003) .000 (.003) 
% Hispanic .005 (.004) .009** (.003) 
% Recent movers -.007 (.008) .001 (.006) 
% Foreign born -.004 (.005) -.011** (.003) 
%  Young Male (15-34) .005 (.020) -.007 (.016) 
Midwest .162 (.125) .189* (.080) 
South .044 (.117) .142 (.072) 
West .294* (.116) .109 (.078) 
Constant -7.261** (.617) -3.445** (.389) 
Variance Components      
Immigrant Prevalence .015** (.005) .012** (.004) 
Intercept -1.076** (.044) -1.138** (.048) 
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